Our Mistakes in Korea

Without a doubt, the conflict in Korea that broke out in 1950 marked a turning point in the Cold War. For one thing, the American idea of the containment was taken outside of Europe to a global level for the first time. The very idea of domino theory now extended into Asia and later to Latin America and Africa as a result of the precedent set in Korea. In the end, the United States did not fully achieve the desired result of the war, that being to create a fully capitalist system across the peninsula. Instead, the conflict simply resulted in a cease-fire, but no treaty has ever been signed. In technical terms, therefore, the Korean War continues in 2009. This can be seen clearly considering the fact that Korea itself remains divided, the demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel remains one of the most dangerous places on earth, and the United States continues to keep up a troop level of about 28,000 soldiers in Korea.

Shortly after a ceasefire had been reached, Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall wrote an editorial in The Atlantic in September of 1953, outlining what he considered to be our numerous “mistakes in Korea.” His editorial indeed gives a powerful critique of U.S. policy from the perspective of a military officer. You can read this article by clicking here. You can also check out the BBC’s excellent coverage of the legacy of the war by clicking here.

After reading Marshall’s article, I would like you all to reflect on and discuss the following: According to Marshall, with what attitude on the part of the U.S. government did the conflict begin? What are some major problems that he cited in regard to U.S. decision making in Korea? What assumption did U.S. planners of the war make regarding the opposition? Is this a common ailment suffered by world powers throughout history? Is this an ailment that the United States has faced at other points in its own history? What additional opposing force had the U.S. not considered fighting in planning for this war? Did the conflict in Korea force the US to lose its concentration on a more important objective? What style of warfare did the Korean conflict devolve into? Why were U.S. forces ultimately not able to achieve victory? What was the purpose of introducing troop rotation in Korea? What were the results? This is a strategy that the U.S. military still employs currently. Why do you think it is still used? What is your opinion of its effectiveness? What ready reserve of troops did the U.S. fail to put to work right away? Why? Are there current parallels to be found here as well? What “unique experiment” was launched in Korea? Would this be the last time such an experiment is launched in U.S. history? What changes and continuities can be observed in U.S. involvement in Korea since the truce was reached in the conflict? What is Marshall’s overall assessment of Korea’s role in being a strategic position for the U.S.? In retrospect, do you agree or disagree? What elements of domino theory are presented in the article? What lessons do you feel the U.S. can learn from its “mistakes in Korea?” Have such lessons been learned? Your thoughts…