“We Support the Mujahidin”

The last of the major Cold War conflicts took place in Afghanistan starting in 1979. After Islamic leaders took control of the country in response to a pro-Soviet coup the previous year in this formally non-aligned state, Soviet forces swept in to restore the communist government in Afghanistan. What the Soviet Union thought would be an easy battle became a 9 year long bloodbath that the Soviet government would consider, by 1986, too costly and unwinnable. Because the U.S. was still on a Cold War footing, even at this very late date, it lent its support to the mujahidin (literally, “Islamic warriors”) fighting against the Soviets, including a certain Saudi member by the name of Osama bin Laden. Although the U.S. did not send any of its troops into Afghanistan, the mujahidin would be supplied with state of the art training and weapons (including U.S. Stinger missiles). Along with the support, the U.S. promised support in rebuilding Afghanistan after war’s end. Sadly, such support never came because the U.S. quickly lost interest in Afghanistan after the Cold War had run its course, and the U.S. become vilified in the eyes of the mujahidin, a vilification that would eventually culminate in the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

Although the U.S. generally kept quiet about its support for the mujahidin, there is an excess of documents that exist that prove that such support indeed took place. You can read a Soviet intelligence report from 09/01/80 by clicking here, as well as a report from 09/01/81 by clicking here, which describes the type of training that counterrevolutionaries were receiving from U.S. military personnel. In fact, by 1988, even President Ronald Reagan was open about U.S. support for the Mujahidin in his State of the Union Address (you can read that by clicking here; you don't have to read the whole thing, but please read his comments on the Mujahidin near the end of his speech).

You may also find it interesting to look at the BBC’s timeline of the war in Afghanistan by clicking here. You may also find it enlightening to read a BBC news article about the Taliban that was written in 1998 (by clicking here) and the dangerous threat the BBC reported Osama bin Laden to be as early as 1999 (by clicking here).

After reading the documents, I would like you all to think about and discuss the following: In what way are Afghan counterrevolutionaries being trained according to Soviet intelligence reports? What type of warfare are they being taught? What kinds of weapons are being used? What types of characters are being trained by U.S. forces? Is the U.S. responsible for training terrorists during the Cold War? By 1988, was the U.S. any longer secretive of its support of the mujahidin in Afghanistan? What does Reagan specifically state in the latter part of his State of the Union Address? What is your opinion of U.S. support of the mujahidin during the war? Do you feel that our Cold War policies there backfired in the end? Why or why not? Has U.S. Cold War foreign policy caused foreign policy issues for the country in the early part of the 21st century? Your thoughts…

Dr. Strangelove Discussion Board

Thanks to all who came out to the film today. As many times as I've seen it now, it still remains just as fresh, just as hilarious, just as disturbing, and just as shocking as the first time I saw it. For those of you that saw it today, what did you think? Feel free to discuss...

Also if you enjoyed today's film, and you are enjoying our discussion regarding the Cold War, I highly recommend George Clooney's 2005 masterpiece Good Night, and Good Luck. The film takes place during the early Cold War as McCarthy's Red Scare is sweeping the country. You can check out the trailer below.

The Feminine Mystique

During the early 1960s, several events exposed the disjuncture between the images and realities of American women’s lives. As popular culture enthusiastically celebrated marriage and motherhood, women who expressed dissatisfaction with childrearing or homemaking were often dismissed as neurotic or communist. Nonetheless, increasing numbers of women were working outside the home and attaining college degrees. Many of these women encountered job discrimination. The airlines, for example, routinely fired women who were older than thirty-two or who got married. In most industries, wage disparities between men and women were commonplace. The few feminist organizations that remained active were weak.

Women’s issues gained renewed visibility with the election of John F. Kennedy. In 1961, he formed the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women. After the committee documented widespread pay inequities between the sexes, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which required equal wages for men and women in the same jobs. But the law’s effect was limited since few women held such “male” jobs.

Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique had a much larger impact. Born in Peoria, Illinois in 1921, Betty Goldstein graduated with a psychology degree from Smith College in 1942. After spending a year at the University of California-Berkeley, she moved to New York City. In 1947, she married Carl Friedan (they divorced in 1969). While working as a free-lance magazine writer, Friedan raised three children and lived as a suburban housewife. When she attended her college reunion in 1957, she circulated a questionnaire to her former classmates. Their answers revealed deep frustration and unhappiness. Struck by these results, Friedan interviewed dozens of women, psychologists, and other experts. She published her conclusions in The Feminine Mystique (you can read excerpts from it by clicking here). The book became an immediate and controversial bestseller. Friedan received thousands of letters from grateful women. In 1966, she helped to found the National Organization for Women (NOW). She remains an active writer and women’s activist.

After reading portions of Friedan’s words, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: According to Friedan, what is the “problem that has no name?” Why are so many women dissatisfied? What solutions does Friedan propose? Describe the social and political impact of The Feminine Mystique. Who do you think found Friedan’s message most compelling? Who do you think found it most objectionable? Your thoughts…

Video Footage of the Fall of Saigon and US Retreat

Vietnam was a major blow against the United States during the Cold War, as it in no way was even a draw. The United States suffered an embarrassing defeat in Vietnam, resulting in a communist takeover of the entire country. The final moments of the Vietnam conflict can be seen quite candidly in the news footage below.

“I Made Promises to Dead People”

The Domino Theory, which warned that communism must be halted before it spread, led U.S. policy makers to begin sending large numbers of U.S. troops to Vietnam in 1965. To many Americans, the Vietnam conflict seemed part of America’s altruistic effort to make the world a better place, but increasingly, the war in Vietnam frustrated Americans. By 1968, more than 500,000 Americans were deployed in Southeast Asia, and the United States’ efforts to use its colossal military firepower and resources to defeat the communist Vietcong were ineffective. The war soon came to represent a hopeless cause that led to personal alienation and deep distrust of American institutions among many young Americans. The document that I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here) records the insights of Jack McCloskey, an Army medic who served in Vietnam in 1967-68. [PLEASE BE ADVISED: THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENT CONTAINS STRONG LANGUAGE].

After reading McCloskey’s candid comments, I would like you to reflect on and discuss the following: Why do you suppose that nonwhites and poor whites seem to account for most of the soldiers in Vietnam? According to Jack McCloskey, why did Vietnam veterans become so alienated? How did returning veterans cope with this alienation? What is the difference between McCloskey’s war in Vietnam as perceived by his father and uncles? After reading this document, how would you define patriotism? Your thoughts…

“The Incredible War”

In the initial stages of the U.S. military build-up in Vietnam, a large majority of Americans supported the Johnson administration’s actions. But as the war dragged on and casualties mounted, popular opposition surged. By 1967, tens of thousands of Americans from all walks of life were joining anti-war demonstrations.

College professors and students were among the first to protest. In March 1965, the University of Michigan hosted a teach-in to foster awareness of U.S. policies. Others colleges held similar events. The following month, 25,000 people, mostly students, gathered for the March on Washington to End the War in Vietnam, an event organized by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Paul Potter, SDS president, gave a speech, which I would like you to read, at the rally (you can read it by clicking here). SDS became the leading anti-war group among leftists and college students. In 1966, as the government called up more draftees, resistance escalated. Opponents of the draft criticized the system’s impact on the poor and minorities as well as loopholes that enabled the affluent to escape military service. As the war’s costs reached $20 billion a year, many Americans were outraged when Congress instituted new taxes and cut Great Society programs. Liberal intellectuals, pacifists, clergy, business leaders, and politicians joined those criticizing the war. By 1969, Americans were polarized in their views on Vietnam.

After reading Potter’s speech, I would like you to reflect on and discuss the following: Why is Potter so opposed to the Vietnam War? How does Potter claim that the war is affecting American society? What does Potter believe is necessary to stop the war? Are his recommendations practical? What impact did anti-war demonstrations have on U.S. policies in Vietnam? Would you have joined the anti-war movement? Explain. Your thoughts…

George Ball and Robert McNamara on U.S. Policy in Vietnam

In the months following the Diem and Kennedy assassinations, the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated. Convinced that the collapse of the anti-communist government was imminent, U.S. officials urged Lyndon Johnson to escalate American military involvement in Vietnam. At first, Johnson acted cautiously and approved only the dispatch of an additional 5,000 military advisors. Focused on defeating Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential race, Johnson avoided public discussions on the American role in Vietnam. “If you’ve got an ugly mother-in-law, and she’s got one eye in the middle of her forehead, you don’t put her in the living room,” he explained in his inimitable fashion.

Privately, however, Johnson’s aides were drafting a resolution that would dramatically expand the president’s ability to fight communism in Southeast Asia. On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats fired on the U.S. destroyer Maddox during an espionage mission in the Gulf of Tonkin. Two days later, sailors on a second U.S. destroyer mistakenly reported a second attack. Johnson purposefully misconstrued the incidents in order to win authorization to “take all necessary measures” in Vietnam. Congress complied by passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 416-0 in the House and 88-2 in the Senate.

In February 1965, after Viet Cong guerillas killed U.S. Marines at Pleiku, Johnson approved Operation Rolling Thunder, a bombing campaign on North Vietnam that continued with periodic suspensions until 1968. A month after the Pleiku attack, Johnson sent two Marine battalions to Da Nang. In late July 1965, after weeks of careful deliberations with his advisors, Johnson announced plans increase the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam from 75,000 to 125,000. By the end of 1967, the figure swelled to 485,000. In the two memos from July 1965 that I would like you to read, Under Secretary of State George Ball (you can read his memo by clicking here; just read section 40) and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (you can read his memo by clicking here) give the president conflicting advice on U.S. strategy in Vietnam.

After reading the two memos, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: How do George Ball and Robert McNamara differ in their appraisals of the situation in Vietnam? What course of action does each man recommend? On what bases do they make these suggestions? Whose advice did Lyndon Johnson accept? Why do you think he made this choice? Was U.S. military intervention in Vietnam justified? Why or why not? Your thoughts…

You may also find it to be enlightening to consider the EXCELLENT coverage of the history of the Vietnam War on the BBC News website by clicking here.

Cuban Missile Crisis Debated at the United Nations

United States political involvement in Cuba dates all the way back to the Spanish-American War in 1898, and it goes back even further in terms of economic presence. The climax of the push-and-pull forces of the supporters of the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy versus the detractors against Yankee Imperialism was reached in October of 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis. To say that the Cuban acceptance of nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union was unprovoked would be a bit of a misnomer. Because of Fidel Castro’s nationalization of Cuban land, which resulted in a dent being put in the pockets of American landowners in Cuba, the U.S. had serious plans of invasion and overthrow of Castro, under the guise of a Cuban instigated coup. The Bay of Pigs invasion, essentially the plan put into action, was a complete failure, and it exposed U.S. intentions in Cuba. Operation Mongoose, another assassination plot against Castro, had also leaked, so it comes as no surprise that Castro would look to the other side of the Cold War battlefield for assistance.

On October 22, 1962, after nuclear missiles and launch sites had been discovered by U.S. spy planes, President Kennedy informed the country of the immediate danger in a speech he gave on television. The document I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here) is a transcript of a debate that took place between the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson and Soviet ambassador to the United Nations V. A. Zorin in the UN Security Council the very next day, October 23, 1962.

After reading excerpts from the debate, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: Why, according to Adlai Stevenson, had Kennedy initiated a quarantine around Cuba? Why is he careful to use that particular term? What does Stevenson state the overall issue with Cuba is? Do you agree with this? What facts does Stevenson choose to leave out of his argument? According to Stevenson, what are the consequences of allowing the missiles to remain? How gave is the situation in Cuba according to his assessment? Why does Soviet ambassador Zorin feel the U.S. is wrong in dictating Soviet policy in Cuba? Does the history of U.S. relations with Latin America undermine its credibility in this situation? Does Zorin use the term “quarantine” to describe Kennedy’s actions? What may be the significance and purpose of his word choice? How does the Bay of Pigs Invasion specifically hurt U.S. credibility in the conflict? Are there statements that Zorin makes that could also be deemed false and misleading? What does Zorin say the consequences of U.S. action in Cuba could be? Does Cuba have a right to Soviet missiles to defend itself from another invasion in your opinion? Why or why not? Whose argument do you find most compelling? What is your overall opinion of the Cuban Missile Crisis? Your thoughts…

“History Will Absolve Me”

Although Latin American republics carried a reputation for political instability after independence, the region took center stage during the Cold War era starting in the 1950s as a new round of revolutionary activity emerged that built on social and economic problems similar to those in Mexico earlier on. The lone successful change came in 1959 with Fidel Castro in Cuba, but his example then spurred other guerilla movements that, particularly in Central America, have continued to the present day. Later on it also helped inspire outright revolution in Nicaragua.

Although he became a symbol of communist insurrection, Castro viewed his revolution as authentically Cuban. Looking back into Cuba’s past, Castro saw a deformed nation. At each moment when a true nationalist sought political power, either he was blocked by foreign intervention, or he betrayed the cause. José Marti, the intellectual spirit of the Cuban independence movement against Spain in 1895, was an authentic Cuban hero. Yet his political program was never realized because of the intervention of the United States during the Spanish-American War of 1898. From that year until Castro seized power in 1959, the United States dominated Cuba politically and economically, despite Cuba’s nominal independence. Presidents of Cuba, such as Batista, talked of reform but used their office to become wealthy, especially by diverting U.S. loans into their own pockets. Meanwhile, the majority of the Cuban people—the poor—were neglected. For Cuba to take control of its destiny, Castro saw the necessity of revolution. After the failure of his first military operation on July 26, 1953, Castro—while in jail—described why the revolution was being fought and what he would do once in power. In the document I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here), one can see that the spirit that animates his program is the same spirit that guides revolutionaries in other parts of Latin America.

After reading the document, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: How radical were Castro’s goals? What were the political implications of implementing them? Who would have been harmed by their implementation? Who would have benefitted? How do they compare with Zapata's goals in Mexico? Your thoughts…

Video Footage of the Test of de-Stalinization in Hungary 1956

Sadly for Hungary, this story did not have a happy ending.

Khrushchev’s Speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party

During the time that Joseph Stalin was the leader of the Soviet Union, he industrialized the country, transformed the agricultural system, and helped to defeat Germany in World War II. However, Stalin also crushed individual freedom and increased his power through police terror (and all the while he managed to maintain a 100% approval rating, ha ha). After he died, his brutal tactics were brought to light, sometimes by political followers such as Nikita Khrushchev, the new head of the Communist Party after the death of Stalin. In 1956, Khrushchev stunned the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party when he delivered the following report that I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here) attacking Stalin as a man of “sickly suspicion.”

After reading excerpts from Khrushchev’s speech, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: Why do you think Khrushchev delivered this devastating attack on the former leader in the Soviet Union? What objectives do you feel he may be trying to achieve through this? How does he contrast the decisions of Lenin with decisions of Stalin? How does Khrushchev criticize Stalin’s policies in the Great Patriotic War (aka World War II)? How does he criticize Stalin’s domestic policies after the war? How might this speech have signaled the beginning of a new Soviet era? Were such policies of de-Stalinization short-lived? Why in your opinion? Your thoughts…

Our Mistakes in Korea

Without a doubt, the conflict in Korea that broke out in 1950 marked a turning point in the Cold War. For one thing, the American idea of the containment was taken outside of Europe to a global level for the first time. The very idea of domino theory now extended into Asia and later to Latin America and Africa as a result of the precedent set in Korea. In the end, the United States did not fully achieve the desired result of the war, that being to create a fully capitalist system across the peninsula. Instead, the conflict simply resulted in a cease-fire, but no treaty has ever been signed. In technical terms, therefore, the Korean War continues in 2009. This can be seen clearly considering the fact that Korea itself remains divided, the demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel remains one of the most dangerous places on earth, and the United States continues to keep up a troop level of about 28,000 soldiers in Korea.

Shortly after a ceasefire had been reached, Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall wrote an editorial in The Atlantic in September of 1953, outlining what he considered to be our numerous “mistakes in Korea.” His editorial indeed gives a powerful critique of U.S. policy from the perspective of a military officer. You can read this article by clicking here. You can also check out the BBC’s excellent coverage of the legacy of the war by clicking here.

After reading Marshall’s article, I would like you all to reflect on and discuss the following: According to Marshall, with what attitude on the part of the U.S. government did the conflict begin? What are some major problems that he cited in regard to U.S. decision making in Korea? What assumption did U.S. planners of the war make regarding the opposition? Is this a common ailment suffered by world powers throughout history? Is this an ailment that the United States has faced at other points in its own history? What additional opposing force had the U.S. not considered fighting in planning for this war? Did the conflict in Korea force the US to lose its concentration on a more important objective? What style of warfare did the Korean conflict devolve into? Why were U.S. forces ultimately not able to achieve victory? What was the purpose of introducing troop rotation in Korea? What were the results? This is a strategy that the U.S. military still employs currently. Why do you think it is still used? What is your opinion of its effectiveness? What ready reserve of troops did the U.S. fail to put to work right away? Why? Are there current parallels to be found here as well? What “unique experiment” was launched in Korea? Would this be the last time such an experiment is launched in U.S. history? What changes and continuities can be observed in U.S. involvement in Korea since the truce was reached in the conflict? What is Marshall’s overall assessment of Korea’s role in being a strategic position for the U.S.? In retrospect, do you agree or disagree? What elements of domino theory are presented in the article? What lessons do you feel the U.S. can learn from its “mistakes in Korea?” Have such lessons been learned? Your thoughts…

Communists in the Government

The fight against communism in the Cold War abroad spread to domestic affairs in the second Red Scare. Losing Eastern Europe and China to communism and witnessing the Soviets develop an atomic bomb with alarming quickness convinced many Americans that secret information had been leaked. Adding to this situation were the relentless accusations from the House Committee on Un-American Activities that subversives were in the government, as well as several sensational “spy trials” involving secret documents allegedly sent to the Soviets. Early in 1950, an obscure Republican senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, exploited this growing public fear. He launched an anticommunism campaign with a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia (that you can read excerpts from by clicking here) which he later repeated in Congress because there was some discrepancy over the exact number of names of communists McCarthy possessed. The speech launched a four-year witch-hunt, during which outrageous accusations and fear of communist subversives in the government obscured evidence and substance. His ruthless tactics and militant anticommunism won admirers and detractors. In December 1954, the Senate officially censured McCarthy for unbecoming conduct. He died in relative obscurity three years later.

After reading excerpts from McCarthy’s speech, I would like for you to think about and discuss the following: To what does Joseph McCarthy attribute America’s postwar problems? Does McCarthy make a convincing argument that John S. Service should not work in the government? What does this speech reveal about American fears in the early Cold War period? Was Joseph McCarthy’s influence on the United States positive or negative in your opinion? Your thoughts…

A Guide for Surviving Nuclear War

After the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, the Soviets began an intensive effort to build their own nuclear weapons. Tremendous government support and information from spies within the American atomic program enabled them to succeed quickly. In August 1949, the first Soviet atomic bomb was exploded in Kazakhstan.

U.S. officials were determined to maintain the edge in the nuclear arms race. Following detonation of the Soviet bomb, President Harry S. Truman approved the development of a more powerful fusion-based hydrogen bomb. In November 1952, the first American hydrogen bomb was successfully tested on the Pacific island of Eniwetok. Nine months later, the Soviets exploded their own hydrogen weapon. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration adopted the “New Look,” a defense strategy based on an expanded nuclear arsenal, additional collective security agreements, and greater use of covert operations. Because nuclear weapons were less expensive than their conventional counterparts, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson explained, the New Look offered “more bang for the buck.”

As the U.S. nuclear arsenal grew, the federal government tried to calm popular anxiety about atomic war. From 1951 until 1965, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) conducted civil defense programs all over the United States. Through publications, films, and evacuation drills, the AEC trained citizens to “prepare” for nuclear attack (you can read one of their pamphlets by clicking here). During the same time period, the United States conducted hundreds of atmospheric and underground nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean and the Nevada desert. The tests usually went unnoticed by the general public and the government made little effort to assess the effects of the fallout released. In response, atomic scientists and peace activists warned that fallout could trigger epidemics of cancer and widespread birth defects. In 1958, fears of fallout prompted the United States and the Soviet Union to suspend atmospheric nuclear tests.

After reading the AEC pamphlet’s contents, I would like you to reflect on and discuss the following: How would you describe the tone of the pamphlet? How does it portray the threat posed by atomic weapons? According to the pamphlet, what measures would increase one’s chances of surviving an atomic attack? What is your opinion of these suggestions? Throughout much of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers claimed that America’s large nuclear arsenal decreased the chances of war with the Soviet Union. Do you agree? Explain your answer. Since the 9/11 attacks, the government has instituted new civil defense programs through the Department of Homeland Security that urge citizens to “be prepared” for terrorist attacks. How do these initiatives compare to their Cold War predecessors? Your thoughts…

Berlin Wall Newsreel in 1961

This is also an interesting one to watch to capture the feel of the time.

Berlin Airlift Newsreel in 1948

By the middle of the 20th century, newsreels shown in movie theaters such as the one below are interesting (albeit biased) primary sources to consider.

Secretary of State George C. Marshall Offers Aid to Europe

In June 1947, three months after announcing the Truman Doctrine, the U.S. government offered European nations assistance in rebuilding their economies. The timing was extremely favorable. Many European nations were mired in poverty, starvation, and disease. Recovery efforts had stalled. The brutal winter of 1946-47 made things worse. Capitalizing on these grave conditions, communists were gaining power in France and Italy. Truman and his advisors were alarmed by these developments and proposed bold measures to rehabilitate the European economy.

On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the European Recovery Plan (also known as the Marshall Plan) during an address at Harvard University (you can read the Marshall Plan by clicking here). Significantly, the U.S. offered aid to virtually all European nations, even those currently under communist domination (even to the Soviet Union directly). Truman and his aides assumed, correctly, that Stalin would not permit Eastern European participation because the plan required that U.S. officials supervise and administer aid. Between 1948 and 1951, sixteen West European nations working with the new Economic Cooperation Administration received $13 billion in U.S. economic assistance. Several nations experienced stunning industrial and agricultural recoveries and became new markets for American products. As conditions improved, communism declined. The Marshall Plan is now considered one of the greatest successes in American foreign policy and has inspired other international development programs.

After reading the Marshall Plan, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: According to Marshall, what are the political and economic conditions in Europe? How does he propose that the United States respond? Was the Marshall Plan necessary? What did the United States gain from offering economic assistance to Europe? Your thoughts…

The Truman Doctrine

In 1947, the Truman administration made public its new containment policy. On February 21, the British informed U.S. officials that they could no longer afford to aid the Greek and Turkish governments in their efforts to suppress leftist rebels. Determined to prevent communism from penetrating the Mediterranean, President Harry S. Truman agreed to assume Britain’s commitment to Greece and Turkey. Truman and his advisors knew that it would be difficult to gain support for such a radical departure from America’s tradition of non-interventionist foreign policy (excluding the U.S. record of intervention in Latin America). In a February 27 meeting, congressional leaders told Truman that he would have to frighten the American public in order to gain support for aiding Greece and Turkey.

Truman took this advice. On March 12, he addressed a joint session of Congress and emphasized the precarious state of foreign affairs (you can read his address by clicking here). If the United States failed to act in the Mediterranean, he warned, democratic governments everywhere would face grave dangers. Although Truman did not specifically mention communism, his speech (soon known as the Truman Doctrine) eloquently enunciated the emerging global struggle between democratic and communist nations. His remarks persuaded a Republican-dominated Congress to approve a $400 million aid package to Greece and Turkey and signaled American willingness to combat the spread of Communism abroad.

After reading Truman’s address, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: How does Truman describe conditions in Greece and Turkey? Why does he believe that American aid to these nations is so essential? What does Truman is at stake if the United States fails to help free countries facing armed insurgencies? Do you think he was right? Your thoughts…

The Cold War: Beginnings

In 1946 the former prime minister of Britain, Winston Churchill, delivered a commencement speech at an American college in which he coined the term “iron curtain” to describe the barriers between communist societies in Europe and what would become known as the “free world.” With this speech, the recognition of the emerging Cold War advanced. Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, replied to the speech, making counteraccusations.

The Cold War had been building for some time. After the Russian Revolution, countries like Britain and the United States attempted intervention, and long opposed the apparent threat of communism. Winston Churchill, as a conservative politician in Britain, was firm in his opposition to the revolutionary regime, though he also warned of the Nazi threat. Western hostility helped persuade Stalin, in 1939, briefly to join with Germany.

Then came Hitler’s attack on Russia, and for several years the Soviets, British, and Americans were united against the Axis powers. Negotiations toward a postwar settlement, however, revealed increasing differences, with the Soviets eager to extend communism and set up a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, and Churchill and the American leaders equally eager to resist. By 1946, Soviet actions to increase communist power in the East European countries it occupied, including its zone of Germany, seemed increasingly ominous. Soon, American-led responses, backed by Britain, would seek to bolster the rest of Europe against the Soviet threat. The Cold War was on.

The two documents that I would like you to read derive from the Churchill speech, entitled “The Sinews of Peace” (you can read that by clicking here) and Stalin’s reply which, among other things, reminded Churchill that he had been voted out of office in Britain after his wartime leadership (you can read that by clicking here).

Historians have been debating the nature of the Cold War for several decades. At first, American scholars largely blamed Soviet aggression. But a revisionist school, emerging in the 1960s, wondered if American actions had not been at least as significant, in drawing lines and mounting confrontations that were not necessary.

The Cold War divided much of the world for over 40 years. As you will see in the coming days, it led to a massive arms race, whose implications are still important in the world today. It also fueled several regional wars, including Korea, Vietnam, and, for the Soviets, Afghanistan. Finally, it ultimately exhausted the Soviet economy and challenged American vitality, until, with the Soviet collapse in 1989-1991, it drew to a close. Get ready folks, this is going to be an eventful week to say the least!

After reading the two documents, I would like you all to think about and discuss the following: How does Churchill define the Iron Curtain and the Soviet threat? What does he propose to resist this threat? How did Stalin defend Soviet actions? How would he have explained the growing tension with the West? Judging by the Churchill and Stalin speeches, who was responsible for the Cold War? Was one side more involved than the other? Your thoughts…

Cold War Origins: A Soviet Perspective

According to some scholars there is a Soviet version of the Long Telegram: a cable sent to Moscow from Washington in September 1946 by the recently appointed Soviet ambassador to the United States, Nikolai Novikov. Trained in the early 1930s at Leningrad State University in Middle Eastern economics and languages, Novikov abandoned plans for an academic career when he was drafted into the Foreign Service because of his knowledge of the Middle East. In 1941 he was named ambassador to Egypt, where he also served as liaison to the Yugoslav and Greek governments in exile, both of which were located in Cairo. Early in 1945 he was named deputy chief of the Soviet mission in Washington D.C.; in April he became Soviet ambassador to the United States. He resigned from the Foreign Service in 1947 and returned to the Soviet Union, where he lived in obscurity. He published a memoir of his Foreign Service career in 1989.

We have little information about the background of Novikov’s telegram, which was unknown to scholars until a Soviet official revealed it to a group of Soviet and U.S. historians attending a meeting on the origins of the Cold War in Washington in 1990. According to Novikov’s memoir, while he and the Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov were attending the Paris foreign ministers’ conference in August 1946, Molotov requested that he write an analysis of U.S. foreign policy goals. Also according to Novikov, Molotov examined an early outline of the document in Paris and made several suggestions about improvements. This information lends credence to the theory that Molotov, who favored a hard line against the West, wanted Novikov’s report to present a dark and perhaps exaggerated picture of U.S. foreign policy goals to strengthen his hand against rivals who favored caution and compromise.

We know that Molotov read Novikov’s completed cable. The passages underlined in the excerpt from the cable I would like you read (you can read it by clicking here) were passages that Molotov himself underlined on the original document. What happened next is unclear. Did Molotov show the telegram to Stalin and other high-ranking officials? Did Novikov’s telegram contribute to the atmosphere of confrontation building in 1946? The answer to both questions is probably yes, but until historians gain access to Soviet archives, no one will know exactly how important Novikov’s telegram was in the Cold War’s murky beginnings.

After reading excerpts from Novikov’s telegram, I would like you all to consider and discuss the following: What specific evidence does Novikov cite to prove his assertion that the goal of U.S. foreign policy is now world domination? In his view, how does the United States propose to achieve its goal? What is his evaluation of U.S. strengths and weaknesses? How does he view the prospects of Anglo-American cooperation? Is this something the Soviet Union should fear? Why or why not? How does Novikov’s analysis compare with Kennan’s description in the Long Telegram of the “Postwar Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine?” What insights does your answer provide about the reasons Novikov’s memorandum was written? Your thoughts…

Cold War Origins: A U.S. Perspective

Historians have minutely examined the events and issues that led to the Cold War, and much has been written about which side, the Soviet Union or the United States, was more to blame for causing it. One thing is certain, however: 1946 was a pivotal year in Soviet-U.S. relations. Until then, despite wartime disagreements over military strategy and emerging differences about the postwar settlement in Europe, many statesmen and diplomats sought cooperation, not confrontation, between the two emerging superpowers. During 1946, however, attitudes hardened. Negotiations over nuclear arms control failed in June, and the Paris foreign ministers’ conference over Eastern Europe ended with very sharp words in August. By the end of the year moderates such as U.S. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace and the Soviet career diplomat Maksim Litvinov had both been removed from office. Leaders on both sides now saw little chance that further Soviet-U.S. conflict could by avoided.

Within the U.S. administration one document in particular articulated this bleak assessment of Soviet-U.S. relations in 1946. Written in February by the Moscow-based career diplomat George Kennan, what came to be known as the Long Telegram profoundly influenced U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar era and throughout the Cold War. Its author, born into a strict Protestant household in Milwaukee in 1904, entered U.S. Foreign Service directly after graduating from Princeton in 1925. Having mastered Russian through studies at the University of Berlin, he served in Moscow, Berlin, and Prague before returning to Moscow in 1944 as a special advisor to the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman. In early February 1946 he received a directive from the State Department to analyze a recent speech by Joseph Stalin that Washington considered confrontational and hostile. Kennan, an advocate of a hard line against the Soviet Union, used the opportunity to compose what is arguably the best-known such dispatch in the history of the U.S. Foreign Service (you can read excerpts from the Long Telegram by clicking here). The Long Telegram was read by State Department officials, cabled to U.S. embassies around the world, and made required reading for hundreds of military officers. In 1947 an edited version of the telegram was published as an article by “X” in the journal Foreign Affairs.

In 1947 Kennan was appointed head of the State Department’s newly created policy planning staff with the responsibility for long-range foreign policy planning. His opposition to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to increased military spending, and to U.S. involvement in the Korean War led to his resignation in 1951. Afterwards, with the exception of brief ambassadorships to the Soviet Union in 1952 and to Yugoslavia between 1961 and 1963, he devoted himself to research, writing, and university teaching on foreign policy and Soviet affairs before his death in 2005 (to think this is someone who literally saw World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and September 11, 2001!).

After reading excerpts from the Long Telegram, I would like you all to consider and discuss the following: What views of capitalism and socialism are articulated, according to Kennan, in official Soviet propaganda? What does Kennan consider the most notable characteristics of the Russian past? How, according to Kennan, has this past shaped the policies and views of the Soviet government since in 1917? In Kennan’s view, what role does communist ideology play in shaping the Soviet government’s policies? According to Kennan, what strengths and weaknesses does the Soviet Union bring to the anticipated conflict with the United States? What, according to Kennan, are the implications of his analysis for U.S. foreign and domestic policies? What must be done to counter the Soviet threat? Your thoughts…

Was the Use of a Nuclear Weapon Really Necessary to End the War?

The dropping of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on August 6th and 9th respectively, without a doubt was the ultimate climax of a destructive, violent, and unapologetically ruthless first half of the 20th century. The atomic bomb truly proved to be the ultimate weapon for total war. As the two dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 showed, a single atom bomb could obliterate an entire city. Realizing that fact, the Japanese government offered unconditional surrender. According to “conventional wisdom,” it was necessary to drop these two bombs to end the war. The orthodox view, presented by U.S. officials after the event and generally shared by the U.S. public (even today in 2009), is that, by cutting short the war and sparing the casualties that would have occurred in the planned invasion of Japan, the atomic bomb actually saved many lives, Japanese as well as U.S. This explanation concludes that, although use of the bomb was regrettable, it was nonetheless necessary.

In reality, however, such a view ignores the realities of Japan’s situation in 1945, and it stands in clear contrast to the official United States Strategic Bombing Survey report, released by the United States government itself on July 1, 1946. In this government report, several assessments and conclusions are made, including on the actual effects of the atomic bombs and Japan’s struggle to end the war. The report candidly reveals that, in reality, Japan was all but defeated and defenseless, and that the Japanese were actually negotiating an end to the war with the help of Soviet mediation as early as May 1945 (3 months before the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The report is a bit long (32 pages), but I would like you to read the portion of the report under the headings “The Effects of the Atomic Bombs” and “Japan’s Struggle to End the War” (you can read both of these sections by clicking here). This report certainly provides the reader with an entirely different viewpoint as to the possible reason for the use of the bomb.

After reading this utterly shocking survey, I would like for you all to reflect on and discuss the following: How does the survey sum up eyewitness accounts of the blast? What were the effects of the blasts within seconds of dropping the bombs? What were the initial symptoms of radiation exposure, and how long did it take for symptoms to emerge generally? What was the effect of the blasts on the infrastructure of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? What assessment did Rear Admiral Takagi of the Navy General Staff make of Japan’s ability to stay in the war by February of 1944, according to the government survey? By April 7, 1945, what was Japan’s new premier Suzuki likely going to do, according to the survey? By May 1945, what was Japan now in the process of doing? With who’s help? What could be implied regarding the U.S. use of the atom bomb based on this evidence? What, in fact, was the emperor himself calling for by June 1945? In what ways is this report at times contradictory to Stimson's writings? According to this U.S. government report, was the use of the atomic bomb necessary? Could victory have been attained without it? Your thoughts…

August 6, 1945

In 1951 Dr. Arata Osada, a professor of education at the University of Hiroshima, sponsored a project in which young Japanese from primary grades through the university level were asked to write down their memories of the August 6 bombing and its aftermath. Moved by their recollections, he arranged to have published a sample of their compositions in 1951. His stated purpose was to reveal the horrors of nuclear war and thereby encourage nuclear disarmament. An English translation appeared in 1980. You can read the statements of Iwao Nakamura and Atsuko Tsujioka by clicking here. You can also read the statement of Yamaoka Michiko, who was a high school student in Hiroshima in 1945 and recalls the sunny August day when the atomic bomb hit her city, by clicking here. Her memories were recorded by two American researchers at the end of the 1980s, and they encourage us to really ponder the larger meaning of World War II. Finally, the BBC has an EXCELLENT page regarding this and so much more, and you can access it by clicking here.

Rarely am I at a loss for words, but I truly am after reading these documents. Still, I’d like you all to discuss a couple of major points here. First, what memoires of the atomic blast are important to those who were interviewed that you read? In your opinion, did Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor justify the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Your thoughts…

“The Face of War is the Face of Death”

President Truman, who as a senator from Missouri and as vice president under Roosevelt did not even know about the Manhattan Project (the project to build a nuclear atomic bomb), learned of the atomic bomb in a meeting with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on April 25, 1945, two weeks after President Roosevelt’s death. His first response was to appoint a small committee, known as the Interim Committee, to advise him on the use of atomic weapons in the war and the immediate postwar era. Its members included Stimson and seven others: George Harrison, an insurance executive who was a special assistant to Stimson; James Byrnes, a presidential advisor and soon secretary of state; Ralph Bard, undersecretary of the Navy; William Clayton, assistant secretary of state; Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington; Karl Compton, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and James Conant, president of Harvard University. They were advised by a Scientific Panel, made up of four persons who had played leading roles in the Manhattan Project: Enrico Fermi of Columbia University; Arthur H. Compton of the University of Chicago; Ernest Lawrence of the University of California at Berkeley; and Robert Oppenheimer, director of the atomic energy research project at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

The chair of the Interim Committee and the author of the document I would like you to read was Stimson. Born in 1867 in New York City and a graduate of Harvard College and Yale Law School, Stimson had a distinguished career as a lawyer and public servant. Having served as secretary of war under President Taft and secretary of state under President Hoover, he was named secretary of war by the Democratic president Roosevelt in 1940, despite being a Republican. In 1947, after his retirement form public service and less than three years before his death in 1950, he published the article “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb” in Harper’s Magazine. It focuses on the work of the Interim Committee and the reasons why Stimson advised President Truman to drop the bombs on Japan without warning. You can read excerpts from this article by clicking here.

After reading excerpts from the article, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: How did the background and specific purposes of the Manhattan Project affect decision making in 1945? For those who supported the immediate use of the bombs, what specific goals did they hope to achieve? How was the choice of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as targets related to these goals? How seriously does it appear that views opposing the use of atomic weapons were considered by the Interim Committee and Stimson? Why did they ultimately reject such views? What were Stimson’s views of the nature of war? How did his views affect his decision to support the immediate use of the atomic bombs? Your thoughts…

Life in a Japanese Internment Camp

As World War II began, there were more than 100,000 people of Japanese descent living in the country, mainly along the West Coast. After the “surprise” attack on Pearl Harbor, rumors spread that Japanese in America would hinder the war effort through “fifth column” (espionage or sabotage) actions. Reacting to old suspicions, ignorant fears, and racial prejudice toward all Asians, the federal government ordered Japanese Americans—regardless of loyalty or American citizenship—to abandon their homes and business and be placed in “Relocation Centers.” Nearly 110,000 people were incarcerated in centers that resembled concentration camps: They were located in remote areas that had armed guards, barbed-wire fencing, communal living arrangements in wooden barracks, and poor food. Among those relocated was Charles Kikuchi, an American-born child (Nisei) of Japanese immigrants (Issei), who kept a diary of his internment at Tanforan, a temporary assembly area in northern California. Kikuchi’s diary (which you can read excerpts from by clicking here) reveals the tensions of life in the camp as well as his own torn loyalties between his family and Japanese ancestry and his American citizenship.

After you have read the document, I would like you to reflect on and discuss the following: Why does Charles Kikuchi believe the internment will be harmful to Japanese Americans? Where were Kikuchi’s loyalties? Why could Kikuchi see humor in some Americans’ reaction to internment, yet be fearful of nativist groups like the Native Sons of the Golden West? What does Kikuchi’s diary reveal about the situation of Japanese Americans during World War II? Were the relocation camps necessary? Your thoughts…

World War II: Japanese Memories

World War I was shocking to Westerners because of the huge number of casualties. The 1914-1918 war also had some important repercussions outside the West (notably in the Middle East, where it continued into the 1920s). But World War II was far more lethal and was much more of a genuinely global conflict (or series of linked conflicts). A major difference between the two wars was the situation in East Asia and the Pacific. There was no significant fighting in this area during World War I, but between 1937 and 1945 a bitter “war without mercy,” as one leading scholar put it, tore apart the Asia-Pacific region, destroying the lives of millions of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Southeast Asians and leaving their countries in ruins.

Central to the fierce and protracted fighting in East Asia and the western Pacific was the attempt by the Japanese to drive the Western colonial powers from the region and restore “Asia to the Asians.” What did the Japanese think about these goals during the war? The document that I would like you to read provides partial answers to that lingering question. It is drawn from a collection of Japanese oral histories recorded by two American researchers at the end of the 1980s. In it, Nogi Harumichi recalls his experiences as a student in Tokyo in 1940-1941. His memories are particularly interesting for the light they shed on the thinking of many ordinary Japanese prior to the attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. You can ready his words by clicking here.

After reading the document, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: What do Nogi’s memories suggest about Japanese public opinion in 1940-1941? Why was there support in Japan for the invasion of China and Southeast Asia? Does there appear to have been any dissent? To what extent was there a relationship between the reforms of the Meiji era and the Japanese expansion in Korea, China, and Southeast Asia?

The Return to Total War—the United States, 1942

Total war engulfed the world powers once again during World War II, and the United States was certainly no exception in this regard. In western democracies, people were not nearly as ready for another 20th century bloodbath as were the people of the angry, disillusioned Axis powers. Thus, President Roosevelt’s first address to Congress in January 1942 shows him trying to rally the American people for what he warns will be another “all-out” war to counter the aggression of the Axis nations (you can read the speech by clicking here). Notice how he links “modern methods of warfare” with “working and producing” as well as “shooting and fighting” and calls for all-out economic mobilization, conceding that “it will mean the dislocation of the lives and occupations of millions.” How much diversion of national labor and income does he say the war will require? Pay attention to his final call for “total victory.” Do either the means he proposes for fighting the war or this end suggest concern with limiting the war?

The poster above and song (you can see the sheet music and lyrics to the song by clicking here) dealing with Rosie the Riveter, represents one effect of this all-out effort: To compensate for the fifteen million people, mostly men, who were drafted into the armed forces, six million American women were drawn into war work. According to these materials, what were they asked to do? How might such work have affected conventional ideas about gender roles and women’s rights? Your thoughts…

Roosevelt’s Declaration of War Message

For nearly a decade, the Japanese had been expanding into China while the United States worked to thwart the encroachment (yet, ironically, all the while supplying Japan with 80% of its oil and iron ore). Tensions between the two countries remained high, as negotiations either failed or were dismissed. When Japan imperialistically sought to consolidate all of East Asia under its domain in 1941, the United States responded with diplomatic pressure and economic embargoes on goods vital to the Japanese economy. Japanese leaders concluded that to preserve their empire they must fight the United States soon, so preparations were made to attack Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and expand further in Asia. The United States had broken Japan’s diplomatic secret code and knew that some attack was imminent, but the location was not known. American leaders guessed the attack would come in Southeast Asia (possibly Malaya, possibly the Philippines), so only general warnings were sent to forces at Pearl Harbor. On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, Japanese planes stuck American forces at Pearl Harbor in two separate waves, crippling the Pacific fleet and killing more than 2,000 Americans. The next day, President Franklin Roosevelt gave a speech to a joint session of Congress. You can read the speech by clicking here.

After reading the speech, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: In what manner does Roosevelt characterize the actions of the Japanese? Why does he offer a listing of locations where the Japanese have attacked? How will the United States “make certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us?” Your thoughts…

Join Us on Wednesday, March 25th for a Screening of "Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb"

The premiere of the Five for Five Film Festival launched today with James Moll's The Last Days in the theater. Needless to say, the screening was a success. Thanks to all who came to the premiere. You were a superb audience, and obviously the film had a profound effect on all in attendance. Next week, on Wednesday, March 25th, the second film in our series will be screened: Stanley Kubrick's 1964 masterpiece Dr. Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. For me, Dr. Strangelove is the greatest Cold War film ever made, and one of the greatest films ever made of any genre. Kubrick's film was nominated for 4 Oscars in 1964, including Best Picture. The author of your textbook, Dr. Jerry Bentley describes it as a film that "comedically represented the leaders of the United States and the USSR as insane morons whose irrational policies guaranteed the destruction of all life on earth through nuclear war." It really is a primary document in and of itself, as it really manages to give the viewer an authentic impression of the mindset of Americans at this extremely frightening time in human history. The film will be shown at 2:30 pm in my room. Again, NO EXTRA CREDIT IS OFFERED FOR ATTENDING. There are only 30 available spots due to limited seating in my room, so please sign up early right here in the comments section of this blog post. Dr. Strangelove is rated PG, and it has a runtime of 93 minutes. A trailer for the film can be viewed below. I hope to see you there.

"The Last Days" Discussion Board

I find that a Holocaust film without actors but instead starring the actual survivors is most effective. As many times as I have seen The Last Days now, it never ceases to grab my heart and mind and wring it mercilessly. For those of you that made it to the screening, what are your thoughts regarding what we viewed?

Darfur Now?

So many by now have heard the word "Darfur" but have little idea what has gone on in that region of Sudan over the past several years. As I reflect on the Holocaust, and as I try to hope that we have seen our last genocide, I am troubled the fact that not only have we seen questionable or deliberate acts of genocide since the Holocaust, but we've seen it several times (Cambodia 1975-1979, East Timor 1973-1982, Iraq 1988, Burundi 1993-2000, Rwanda 1994, Bosnia 1994, Chechnya 1999-?, Sudan 2003-?). The atrocities that have taken place in the Darfur region of Sudan are incredibly troubling. The BBC, as always, has excellent coverage of the Sudan situation that you can read about in their Special Report by clicking here. They also have an excellent question and answer page on the topic that you can read by clicking here. Remember folks, ignorance is not bliss, but knowledge is indeed empowering.

“Führer, You Order. We Obey”

On gaining power, the Nazis began to implement the anti-Jewish policies Hitler and the Nazis had promised in Mein Kampf and thousands of books, pamphlets, and speeches. Jewish shops were plundered while police looked the other way, Jewish physicians were excluded from hospitals, Jewish judges lost their posts, Jewish students were denied admission to universities, and Jewish veterans were stripped of their benefits. In 1935 the Nazis promulgated the Nuremberg Laws, which deprived Jews of citizenship and outlawed marriage between Jews and non-Jews. In November 1938 the regime organized nationwide violence against Jewish synagogues and shops in what came to be known as Kristallnacht, or “night of the broken glass.”

After the war began in late 1939, conquests in Eastern Europe gave the Nazis new opportunities to address the “Jewish problem.” In early 1941 they began to deport Jews form Germany and conquered territories to Poland and Czechoslovakia, where Jews were employed as slave laborers or placed in concentration camps. In June 1941 special units known as Einsatzgruppe (“special action forces”) were organized to exterminate Jews in territories conquered on the eastern front. In eighteen months, they gunned down over 1 million Jews and smaller numbers of Gypsies and non-Jewish Slavs. Then in January 1942 at the Wannsee Conference outside Berlin, the Nazi leadership approved the Final Solution to the so-called Jewish problem. Their goal became the extermination of European Jewry, and to reach it they constructed special camps where their murderous work could be done efficiently and quickly.

When World War II ended, the Nazis had not achieved their goal of annihilating Europe’s 11 million Jews. They did, however, slaughter close to 6 million, thus earning themselves a permanent place in the long history of man’s inhumanity to man.

The document excerpts that I would like you to read comes form the memoirs of Rudolf Höss, the commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp in Poland between 1940 and 1943. Born in 1900, Höss abandoned plans to become a priest after serving in World War I and became involved in a number of right-wing political movements, including the Nazi Party, which he joined in the early 1920s. After serving a jail sentence for participating in the murder of a teacher suspected of “treason,” Höss became a farmer and then in 1934, on the urging of Heinrich Himmler, a member of the Nazi SS, or Schutzstaffel (Guard Detachment). The SS under Himmler grew from a small security force to guard Hitler and other high-ranking Nazis into a powerful party organization involved in police work, state security, intelligence gathering, administration of conquered territories, and management of the concentration camps. After postings at the Dachau and Sachsenhausen camps, Höss was appointed commandant of Auschwitz, which began as a camp for Polish political prisoers but became a huge, sprawling complex where over a million Jews were gassed or shot and tens of thousands of prisoners served as slave laborers in nearby factories. In 1943 Höss became overseer of all the Third Reich’s concentration camps, but he returned to Auschwitz in 1944 to administer the murder of 400,000 Hungarian Jews. After his capture in 1946, he was tried and convicted for crimes against humanity by the international military tribunal at Nuremberg. He was hanged on April 16, 1947, within sight of the villa where he and his family had lived while he served as commandant at Auschwitz.

While awaiting trial, Höss was encouraged to compose his memoirs to sharpen his recollection of events he experienced. In the document I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here), he discusses his views of the Jews and his reaction to the mass killings he planned and witnessed.

After reading the document, I would like you all to reflect on and discuss the following: What does Höss claim to have been his attitude toward the Jews? How do his statements about the Jews accord with his assertion that he was a fanatic National Socialist? Does Höss make any distinction between the Russians and Jews that he had exterminated? What was Höss’ attitude toward the Final Solution? How does Höss characterize his role in the mass extermination of the Jews? How did his involvement in the Holocaust affect him personally? How according to Höss, did it affect other German participants? What would you describe as the key components of Höss’ personality? To what extent was his personality shaped by the Nazi philosophy to which he was dedicated? What insight does this excerpt provide about the issue of how much the German people knew of and participated in the Holocaust? Your thoughts…

Himmler on “Evacuation of the Jews”

One of the most heart-crushing chapters in all of human history is the Holocaust. For me, the most disturbing part of this piece of history is the fact that the perpetrators spoke of their actions in the most nonchalant of manners, as if what was taking place was truly normal and desired by the people (unfortunately the latter could be argued as true in the case of so many at this time). Such temperament is clearly exemplified by Heinrich Himmler’s words in a statement given on October 4, 1943. As the head of the SS (Germany’s police force), Himmler took a lead role in Jewish removal and eventual attempted extermination during World War II. You can read his words by clicking here.

After reading Himmler’s words, I would like you to reflect on and discuss the following: How has Germany’s position on dealing with the Jewish population of Germany obviously shifted since the passing of the Nuremberg laws? What can be implied from Himmler’s words as to why this is so? Is the Nazi government any longer trying to force the Jews to leave Germany? Why do you so answer? In what ways does Himmler unapologetically describe Jews in Germany? Do the Nazis have a plan to make their dealings with their Jewish population public? Himmler states that the German government “had the moral right” to carry out their policies against the “Jewish problem.” In what sense does he mean this, and how does he attempt to justify his words? Your thoughts…

A Return to Total War—Germany, 1942

The world saw its first brush with total war in the second decade of the 20th century with WWI. The result was 10 million dead and several million more casualties. Destructive as that conflict proved, it was soon eclipsed by the greater violence that exploded in World War II. By the close of that war in 1945, Europe and the rest of the world had to face the fact that modern nations had unleashed a new kind of unlimited and extremely destructive warfare that had the potential to destroy all of humanity.

The escalating nature of the conflict can be seen in a transcript of a radio broadcast delivered to the German public in October 1942 by Hermann Goering, Hitler’s second in command, who was then trying to mobilize his nation’s economy more fully to match the growing demands of the war (you can read the radio address by clicking here). Goering’s address to the German people reveals how the later American entry into the war (we’ll talk about that in greater detail tomorrow) and its escalation into a total conflict began to affect Germany. Despite having control over most of Europe and eastern Russia, Germany was beginning to suffer from scarcities by late 1942.

After reading the address, I would like you all to think about and discuss the following: What seems to have been most lacking? Observe how Goering reminds the Germans that in the face of such hardships, they must set aside personal interests and fight as “an entire nation, as a totality.” What does he say they must be prepared to give up, and why? His comments on “enemy air attacks” are also worth noting. How does he characterize them? What does he claim they will destroy along with “harmless people?” Do his remarks suggest that the air raids were having a significant effect? What about his reaction to the American threat to wage an all-out economic war against the Axis? How is this a unique characteristic of the time period? Your thoughts…

Neville Chamberlain’s Speech in the House of Commons

In the late 1930s, German leader Adolf Hitler began to expand the German empire. First, the Austrians gave in to Nazi aggression, and agreed to an Anschluss. Next on Hitler’s agenda was Czechoslovakia. The Czech government turned to Britain and France for help, but they refused. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, desperate to maintain European peace, decided to appease Germany by letting it have Czechoslovakia. In the speech that I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here; read pgs. 429-431) to the British House of Commons, Chamberlain explains his decision.

After reading the speech, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: What reasons did Chamberlain give for signing a treaty with Hitler? What is Chamberlain’s overall tone in his speech? What was discussed with Germany at the Munich Conference according to Chamberlain? What is “the real triumph” of the Munich Conference according to Chamberlain? What are his overall goals for Europe? Do you agree or disagree with these goals? Why? Are his aims reasonable in your opinion? Your thoughts…

Japanese Foreign Policy Priorities on the Eve of the China War

Despite the failure of the takeover of central Tokyo by nationalist soldiers and officers of the First Division in early 1936, the military retained a strong voice in government. Many politicians bent over backward in support of the military and its right-wing agenda in order to prevent renewed violence. The cabinet of Hirota Koti, in power from March 1936 to February 1937, increased military spending and passed stricter laws against communists and socialists.

In August 1936 the Hirota cabinet approved the policy on foreign and domestic policy that I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here; read section 2, pgs. 418-420). It is an effort to strike a balance between the army’s traditional focus on north China and Manchuria as a means of countering the Soviet Union’s strength and the navy’s new southward policy and its concerns with U.S. naval power. It also shows the degree to which militarism and expansionism had become the bedrock of Japanese politics on the eve of the war with China.

After you have read the document, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: What view of Japan’s role in Asian affairs is expressed in this statement? What views of the Soviet Union and the Western powers does the document express? According to the authors of the document, what steps must be taken to prepare Japan for the foreign policy challenges it will meet? What specific statements in the document reveal the militarist priorities of the Hirota government? How do the ideas expressed in this document compare to those of the Black Dragon Society’s 1930 anniversary statement? Your thoughts…

Memos on the Aims of Germany and Japan

In the 1930s, Germany and Japan began to build up their military power and agitate for more territory. The Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931, and the Germans took the Rhineland in 1936 (an act specifically forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles). Their goal of world domination was not a secret, as the two memos that I would like you to read suggest. The first was written by Douglas Miller, an official at the United States embassy in Berlin (you can read that memo by clicking here). The second was written by Joseph Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan (you can read that memo by clicking here).

After reading the two memos, I would like you all to think about and discuss the following: What does Douglas Miller outline as the “main purpose of the Nazis?” Why, according to Miller, have so many “adopted the National Socialist [Nazi] point of view for the time being?” What were the “two other purposes subsidiary to the main purpose” of the Nazis, and why are these aims sought? What dangers, according to Miller, do the Nazis pose to German society and their neighbors? What is at the root of the danger posed to Germany’s neighbors? How does Joseph Grew describe the current temperament of Japan? How does Grew say some in the U.S. government are actually strengthening the stand of the Japanese? How are Japan’s political aims described by Grew? Is the U.S. officially taking an anti-Japanese stance in this document? How does Grew propose the U.S. should react to the Japanese threat? What are the similarities between the memos from Douglas Miller and Joseph Grew? Your thoughts…