George Ball and Robert McNamara on U.S. Policy in Vietnam

In the months following the Diem and Kennedy assassinations, the situation in South Vietnam deteriorated. Convinced that the collapse of the anti-communist government was imminent, U.S. officials urged Lyndon Johnson to escalate American military involvement in Vietnam. At first, Johnson acted cautiously and approved only the dispatch of an additional 5,000 military advisors. Focused on defeating Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential race, Johnson avoided public discussions on the American role in Vietnam. “If you’ve got an ugly mother-in-law, and she’s got one eye in the middle of her forehead, you don’t put her in the living room,” he explained in his inimitable fashion.

Privately, however, Johnson’s aides were drafting a resolution that would dramatically expand the president’s ability to fight communism in Southeast Asia. On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats fired on the U.S. destroyer Maddox during an espionage mission in the Gulf of Tonkin. Two days later, sailors on a second U.S. destroyer mistakenly reported a second attack. Johnson purposefully misconstrued the incidents in order to win authorization to “take all necessary measures” in Vietnam. Congress complied by passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 416-0 in the House and 88-2 in the Senate.

In February 1965, after Viet Cong guerillas killed U.S. Marines at Pleiku, Johnson approved Operation Rolling Thunder, a bombing campaign on North Vietnam that continued with periodic suspensions until 1968. A month after the Pleiku attack, Johnson sent two Marine battalions to Da Nang. In late July 1965, after weeks of careful deliberations with his advisors, Johnson announced plans increase the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam from 75,000 to 125,000. By the end of 1967, the figure swelled to 485,000. In the two memos from July 1965 that I would like you to read, Under Secretary of State George Ball (you can read his memo by clicking here; just read section 40) and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (you can read his memo by clicking here) give the president conflicting advice on U.S. strategy in Vietnam.

After reading the two memos, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: How do George Ball and Robert McNamara differ in their appraisals of the situation in Vietnam? What course of action does each man recommend? On what bases do they make these suggestions? Whose advice did Lyndon Johnson accept? Why do you think he made this choice? Was U.S. military intervention in Vietnam justified? Why or why not? Your thoughts…

You may also find it to be enlightening to consider the EXCELLENT coverage of the history of the Vietnam War on the BBC News website by clicking here.

Cuban Missile Crisis Debated at the United Nations

United States political involvement in Cuba dates all the way back to the Spanish-American War in 1898, and it goes back even further in terms of economic presence. The climax of the push-and-pull forces of the supporters of the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy versus the detractors against Yankee Imperialism was reached in October of 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis. To say that the Cuban acceptance of nuclear missiles from the Soviet Union was unprovoked would be a bit of a misnomer. Because of Fidel Castro’s nationalization of Cuban land, which resulted in a dent being put in the pockets of American landowners in Cuba, the U.S. had serious plans of invasion and overthrow of Castro, under the guise of a Cuban instigated coup. The Bay of Pigs invasion, essentially the plan put into action, was a complete failure, and it exposed U.S. intentions in Cuba. Operation Mongoose, another assassination plot against Castro, had also leaked, so it comes as no surprise that Castro would look to the other side of the Cold War battlefield for assistance.

On October 22, 1962, after nuclear missiles and launch sites had been discovered by U.S. spy planes, President Kennedy informed the country of the immediate danger in a speech he gave on television. The document I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here) is a transcript of a debate that took place between the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson and Soviet ambassador to the United Nations V. A. Zorin in the UN Security Council the very next day, October 23, 1962.

After reading excerpts from the debate, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: Why, according to Adlai Stevenson, had Kennedy initiated a quarantine around Cuba? Why is he careful to use that particular term? What does Stevenson state the overall issue with Cuba is? Do you agree with this? What facts does Stevenson choose to leave out of his argument? According to Stevenson, what are the consequences of allowing the missiles to remain? How gave is the situation in Cuba according to his assessment? Why does Soviet ambassador Zorin feel the U.S. is wrong in dictating Soviet policy in Cuba? Does the history of U.S. relations with Latin America undermine its credibility in this situation? Does Zorin use the term “quarantine” to describe Kennedy’s actions? What may be the significance and purpose of his word choice? How does the Bay of Pigs Invasion specifically hurt U.S. credibility in the conflict? Are there statements that Zorin makes that could also be deemed false and misleading? What does Zorin say the consequences of U.S. action in Cuba could be? Does Cuba have a right to Soviet missiles to defend itself from another invasion in your opinion? Why or why not? Whose argument do you find most compelling? What is your overall opinion of the Cuban Missile Crisis? Your thoughts…

“History Will Absolve Me”

Although Latin American republics carried a reputation for political instability after independence, the region took center stage during the Cold War era starting in the 1950s as a new round of revolutionary activity emerged that built on social and economic problems similar to those in Mexico earlier on. The lone successful change came in 1959 with Fidel Castro in Cuba, but his example then spurred other guerilla movements that, particularly in Central America, have continued to the present day. Later on it also helped inspire outright revolution in Nicaragua.

Although he became a symbol of communist insurrection, Castro viewed his revolution as authentically Cuban. Looking back into Cuba’s past, Castro saw a deformed nation. At each moment when a true nationalist sought political power, either he was blocked by foreign intervention, or he betrayed the cause. José Marti, the intellectual spirit of the Cuban independence movement against Spain in 1895, was an authentic Cuban hero. Yet his political program was never realized because of the intervention of the United States during the Spanish-American War of 1898. From that year until Castro seized power in 1959, the United States dominated Cuba politically and economically, despite Cuba’s nominal independence. Presidents of Cuba, such as Batista, talked of reform but used their office to become wealthy, especially by diverting U.S. loans into their own pockets. Meanwhile, the majority of the Cuban people—the poor—were neglected. For Cuba to take control of its destiny, Castro saw the necessity of revolution. After the failure of his first military operation on July 26, 1953, Castro—while in jail—described why the revolution was being fought and what he would do once in power. In the document I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here), one can see that the spirit that animates his program is the same spirit that guides revolutionaries in other parts of Latin America.

After reading the document, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: How radical were Castro’s goals? What were the political implications of implementing them? Who would have been harmed by their implementation? Who would have benefitted? How do they compare with Zapata's goals in Mexico? Your thoughts…

Video Footage of the Test of de-Stalinization in Hungary 1956

Sadly for Hungary, this story did not have a happy ending.

Khrushchev’s Speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party

During the time that Joseph Stalin was the leader of the Soviet Union, he industrialized the country, transformed the agricultural system, and helped to defeat Germany in World War II. However, Stalin also crushed individual freedom and increased his power through police terror (and all the while he managed to maintain a 100% approval rating, ha ha). After he died, his brutal tactics were brought to light, sometimes by political followers such as Nikita Khrushchev, the new head of the Communist Party after the death of Stalin. In 1956, Khrushchev stunned the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party when he delivered the following report that I would like you to read (you can read it by clicking here) attacking Stalin as a man of “sickly suspicion.”

After reading excerpts from Khrushchev’s speech, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: Why do you think Khrushchev delivered this devastating attack on the former leader in the Soviet Union? What objectives do you feel he may be trying to achieve through this? How does he contrast the decisions of Lenin with decisions of Stalin? How does Khrushchev criticize Stalin’s policies in the Great Patriotic War (aka World War II)? How does he criticize Stalin’s domestic policies after the war? How might this speech have signaled the beginning of a new Soviet era? Were such policies of de-Stalinization short-lived? Why in your opinion? Your thoughts…

Our Mistakes in Korea

Without a doubt, the conflict in Korea that broke out in 1950 marked a turning point in the Cold War. For one thing, the American idea of the containment was taken outside of Europe to a global level for the first time. The very idea of domino theory now extended into Asia and later to Latin America and Africa as a result of the precedent set in Korea. In the end, the United States did not fully achieve the desired result of the war, that being to create a fully capitalist system across the peninsula. Instead, the conflict simply resulted in a cease-fire, but no treaty has ever been signed. In technical terms, therefore, the Korean War continues in 2009. This can be seen clearly considering the fact that Korea itself remains divided, the demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel remains one of the most dangerous places on earth, and the United States continues to keep up a troop level of about 28,000 soldiers in Korea.

Shortly after a ceasefire had been reached, Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall wrote an editorial in The Atlantic in September of 1953, outlining what he considered to be our numerous “mistakes in Korea.” His editorial indeed gives a powerful critique of U.S. policy from the perspective of a military officer. You can read this article by clicking here. You can also check out the BBC’s excellent coverage of the legacy of the war by clicking here.

After reading Marshall’s article, I would like you all to reflect on and discuss the following: According to Marshall, with what attitude on the part of the U.S. government did the conflict begin? What are some major problems that he cited in regard to U.S. decision making in Korea? What assumption did U.S. planners of the war make regarding the opposition? Is this a common ailment suffered by world powers throughout history? Is this an ailment that the United States has faced at other points in its own history? What additional opposing force had the U.S. not considered fighting in planning for this war? Did the conflict in Korea force the US to lose its concentration on a more important objective? What style of warfare did the Korean conflict devolve into? Why were U.S. forces ultimately not able to achieve victory? What was the purpose of introducing troop rotation in Korea? What were the results? This is a strategy that the U.S. military still employs currently. Why do you think it is still used? What is your opinion of its effectiveness? What ready reserve of troops did the U.S. fail to put to work right away? Why? Are there current parallels to be found here as well? What “unique experiment” was launched in Korea? Would this be the last time such an experiment is launched in U.S. history? What changes and continuities can be observed in U.S. involvement in Korea since the truce was reached in the conflict? What is Marshall’s overall assessment of Korea’s role in being a strategic position for the U.S.? In retrospect, do you agree or disagree? What elements of domino theory are presented in the article? What lessons do you feel the U.S. can learn from its “mistakes in Korea?” Have such lessons been learned? Your thoughts…

Communists in the Government

The fight against communism in the Cold War abroad spread to domestic affairs in the second Red Scare. Losing Eastern Europe and China to communism and witnessing the Soviets develop an atomic bomb with alarming quickness convinced many Americans that secret information had been leaked. Adding to this situation were the relentless accusations from the House Committee on Un-American Activities that subversives were in the government, as well as several sensational “spy trials” involving secret documents allegedly sent to the Soviets. Early in 1950, an obscure Republican senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, exploited this growing public fear. He launched an anticommunism campaign with a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia (that you can read excerpts from by clicking here) which he later repeated in Congress because there was some discrepancy over the exact number of names of communists McCarthy possessed. The speech launched a four-year witch-hunt, during which outrageous accusations and fear of communist subversives in the government obscured evidence and substance. His ruthless tactics and militant anticommunism won admirers and detractors. In December 1954, the Senate officially censured McCarthy for unbecoming conduct. He died in relative obscurity three years later.

After reading excerpts from McCarthy’s speech, I would like for you to think about and discuss the following: To what does Joseph McCarthy attribute America’s postwar problems? Does McCarthy make a convincing argument that John S. Service should not work in the government? What does this speech reveal about American fears in the early Cold War period? Was Joseph McCarthy’s influence on the United States positive or negative in your opinion? Your thoughts…

A Guide for Surviving Nuclear War

After the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, the Soviets began an intensive effort to build their own nuclear weapons. Tremendous government support and information from spies within the American atomic program enabled them to succeed quickly. In August 1949, the first Soviet atomic bomb was exploded in Kazakhstan.

U.S. officials were determined to maintain the edge in the nuclear arms race. Following detonation of the Soviet bomb, President Harry S. Truman approved the development of a more powerful fusion-based hydrogen bomb. In November 1952, the first American hydrogen bomb was successfully tested on the Pacific island of Eniwetok. Nine months later, the Soviets exploded their own hydrogen weapon. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration adopted the “New Look,” a defense strategy based on an expanded nuclear arsenal, additional collective security agreements, and greater use of covert operations. Because nuclear weapons were less expensive than their conventional counterparts, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson explained, the New Look offered “more bang for the buck.”

As the U.S. nuclear arsenal grew, the federal government tried to calm popular anxiety about atomic war. From 1951 until 1965, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) conducted civil defense programs all over the United States. Through publications, films, and evacuation drills, the AEC trained citizens to “prepare” for nuclear attack (you can read one of their pamphlets by clicking here). During the same time period, the United States conducted hundreds of atmospheric and underground nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean and the Nevada desert. The tests usually went unnoticed by the general public and the government made little effort to assess the effects of the fallout released. In response, atomic scientists and peace activists warned that fallout could trigger epidemics of cancer and widespread birth defects. In 1958, fears of fallout prompted the United States and the Soviet Union to suspend atmospheric nuclear tests.

After reading the AEC pamphlet’s contents, I would like you to reflect on and discuss the following: How would you describe the tone of the pamphlet? How does it portray the threat posed by atomic weapons? According to the pamphlet, what measures would increase one’s chances of surviving an atomic attack? What is your opinion of these suggestions? Throughout much of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers claimed that America’s large nuclear arsenal decreased the chances of war with the Soviet Union. Do you agree? Explain your answer. Since the 9/11 attacks, the government has instituted new civil defense programs through the Department of Homeland Security that urge citizens to “be prepared” for terrorist attacks. How do these initiatives compare to their Cold War predecessors? Your thoughts…

Berlin Wall Newsreel in 1961

This is also an interesting one to watch to capture the feel of the time.

Berlin Airlift Newsreel in 1948

By the middle of the 20th century, newsreels shown in movie theaters such as the one below are interesting (albeit biased) primary sources to consider.

Secretary of State George C. Marshall Offers Aid to Europe

In June 1947, three months after announcing the Truman Doctrine, the U.S. government offered European nations assistance in rebuilding their economies. The timing was extremely favorable. Many European nations were mired in poverty, starvation, and disease. Recovery efforts had stalled. The brutal winter of 1946-47 made things worse. Capitalizing on these grave conditions, communists were gaining power in France and Italy. Truman and his advisors were alarmed by these developments and proposed bold measures to rehabilitate the European economy.

On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the European Recovery Plan (also known as the Marshall Plan) during an address at Harvard University (you can read the Marshall Plan by clicking here). Significantly, the U.S. offered aid to virtually all European nations, even those currently under communist domination (even to the Soviet Union directly). Truman and his aides assumed, correctly, that Stalin would not permit Eastern European participation because the plan required that U.S. officials supervise and administer aid. Between 1948 and 1951, sixteen West European nations working with the new Economic Cooperation Administration received $13 billion in U.S. economic assistance. Several nations experienced stunning industrial and agricultural recoveries and became new markets for American products. As conditions improved, communism declined. The Marshall Plan is now considered one of the greatest successes in American foreign policy and has inspired other international development programs.

After reading the Marshall Plan, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: According to Marshall, what are the political and economic conditions in Europe? How does he propose that the United States respond? Was the Marshall Plan necessary? What did the United States gain from offering economic assistance to Europe? Your thoughts…

The Truman Doctrine

In 1947, the Truman administration made public its new containment policy. On February 21, the British informed U.S. officials that they could no longer afford to aid the Greek and Turkish governments in their efforts to suppress leftist rebels. Determined to prevent communism from penetrating the Mediterranean, President Harry S. Truman agreed to assume Britain’s commitment to Greece and Turkey. Truman and his advisors knew that it would be difficult to gain support for such a radical departure from America’s tradition of non-interventionist foreign policy (excluding the U.S. record of intervention in Latin America). In a February 27 meeting, congressional leaders told Truman that he would have to frighten the American public in order to gain support for aiding Greece and Turkey.

Truman took this advice. On March 12, he addressed a joint session of Congress and emphasized the precarious state of foreign affairs (you can read his address by clicking here). If the United States failed to act in the Mediterranean, he warned, democratic governments everywhere would face grave dangers. Although Truman did not specifically mention communism, his speech (soon known as the Truman Doctrine) eloquently enunciated the emerging global struggle between democratic and communist nations. His remarks persuaded a Republican-dominated Congress to approve a $400 million aid package to Greece and Turkey and signaled American willingness to combat the spread of Communism abroad.

After reading Truman’s address, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: How does Truman describe conditions in Greece and Turkey? Why does he believe that American aid to these nations is so essential? What does Truman is at stake if the United States fails to help free countries facing armed insurgencies? Do you think he was right? Your thoughts…

The Cold War: Beginnings

In 1946 the former prime minister of Britain, Winston Churchill, delivered a commencement speech at an American college in which he coined the term “iron curtain” to describe the barriers between communist societies in Europe and what would become known as the “free world.” With this speech, the recognition of the emerging Cold War advanced. Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, replied to the speech, making counteraccusations.

The Cold War had been building for some time. After the Russian Revolution, countries like Britain and the United States attempted intervention, and long opposed the apparent threat of communism. Winston Churchill, as a conservative politician in Britain, was firm in his opposition to the revolutionary regime, though he also warned of the Nazi threat. Western hostility helped persuade Stalin, in 1939, briefly to join with Germany.

Then came Hitler’s attack on Russia, and for several years the Soviets, British, and Americans were united against the Axis powers. Negotiations toward a postwar settlement, however, revealed increasing differences, with the Soviets eager to extend communism and set up a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, and Churchill and the American leaders equally eager to resist. By 1946, Soviet actions to increase communist power in the East European countries it occupied, including its zone of Germany, seemed increasingly ominous. Soon, American-led responses, backed by Britain, would seek to bolster the rest of Europe against the Soviet threat. The Cold War was on.

The two documents that I would like you to read derive from the Churchill speech, entitled “The Sinews of Peace” (you can read that by clicking here) and Stalin’s reply which, among other things, reminded Churchill that he had been voted out of office in Britain after his wartime leadership (you can read that by clicking here).

Historians have been debating the nature of the Cold War for several decades. At first, American scholars largely blamed Soviet aggression. But a revisionist school, emerging in the 1960s, wondered if American actions had not been at least as significant, in drawing lines and mounting confrontations that were not necessary.

The Cold War divided much of the world for over 40 years. As you will see in the coming days, it led to a massive arms race, whose implications are still important in the world today. It also fueled several regional wars, including Korea, Vietnam, and, for the Soviets, Afghanistan. Finally, it ultimately exhausted the Soviet economy and challenged American vitality, until, with the Soviet collapse in 1989-1991, it drew to a close. Get ready folks, this is going to be an eventful week to say the least!

After reading the two documents, I would like you all to think about and discuss the following: How does Churchill define the Iron Curtain and the Soviet threat? What does he propose to resist this threat? How did Stalin defend Soviet actions? How would he have explained the growing tension with the West? Judging by the Churchill and Stalin speeches, who was responsible for the Cold War? Was one side more involved than the other? Your thoughts…

Cold War Origins: A Soviet Perspective

According to some scholars there is a Soviet version of the Long Telegram: a cable sent to Moscow from Washington in September 1946 by the recently appointed Soviet ambassador to the United States, Nikolai Novikov. Trained in the early 1930s at Leningrad State University in Middle Eastern economics and languages, Novikov abandoned plans for an academic career when he was drafted into the Foreign Service because of his knowledge of the Middle East. In 1941 he was named ambassador to Egypt, where he also served as liaison to the Yugoslav and Greek governments in exile, both of which were located in Cairo. Early in 1945 he was named deputy chief of the Soviet mission in Washington D.C.; in April he became Soviet ambassador to the United States. He resigned from the Foreign Service in 1947 and returned to the Soviet Union, where he lived in obscurity. He published a memoir of his Foreign Service career in 1989.

We have little information about the background of Novikov’s telegram, which was unknown to scholars until a Soviet official revealed it to a group of Soviet and U.S. historians attending a meeting on the origins of the Cold War in Washington in 1990. According to Novikov’s memoir, while he and the Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov were attending the Paris foreign ministers’ conference in August 1946, Molotov requested that he write an analysis of U.S. foreign policy goals. Also according to Novikov, Molotov examined an early outline of the document in Paris and made several suggestions about improvements. This information lends credence to the theory that Molotov, who favored a hard line against the West, wanted Novikov’s report to present a dark and perhaps exaggerated picture of U.S. foreign policy goals to strengthen his hand against rivals who favored caution and compromise.

We know that Molotov read Novikov’s completed cable. The passages underlined in the excerpt from the cable I would like you read (you can read it by clicking here) were passages that Molotov himself underlined on the original document. What happened next is unclear. Did Molotov show the telegram to Stalin and other high-ranking officials? Did Novikov’s telegram contribute to the atmosphere of confrontation building in 1946? The answer to both questions is probably yes, but until historians gain access to Soviet archives, no one will know exactly how important Novikov’s telegram was in the Cold War’s murky beginnings.

After reading excerpts from Novikov’s telegram, I would like you all to consider and discuss the following: What specific evidence does Novikov cite to prove his assertion that the goal of U.S. foreign policy is now world domination? In his view, how does the United States propose to achieve its goal? What is his evaluation of U.S. strengths and weaknesses? How does he view the prospects of Anglo-American cooperation? Is this something the Soviet Union should fear? Why or why not? How does Novikov’s analysis compare with Kennan’s description in the Long Telegram of the “Postwar Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine?” What insights does your answer provide about the reasons Novikov’s memorandum was written? Your thoughts…

Cold War Origins: A U.S. Perspective

Historians have minutely examined the events and issues that led to the Cold War, and much has been written about which side, the Soviet Union or the United States, was more to blame for causing it. One thing is certain, however: 1946 was a pivotal year in Soviet-U.S. relations. Until then, despite wartime disagreements over military strategy and emerging differences about the postwar settlement in Europe, many statesmen and diplomats sought cooperation, not confrontation, between the two emerging superpowers. During 1946, however, attitudes hardened. Negotiations over nuclear arms control failed in June, and the Paris foreign ministers’ conference over Eastern Europe ended with very sharp words in August. By the end of the year moderates such as U.S. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace and the Soviet career diplomat Maksim Litvinov had both been removed from office. Leaders on both sides now saw little chance that further Soviet-U.S. conflict could by avoided.

Within the U.S. administration one document in particular articulated this bleak assessment of Soviet-U.S. relations in 1946. Written in February by the Moscow-based career diplomat George Kennan, what came to be known as the Long Telegram profoundly influenced U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar era and throughout the Cold War. Its author, born into a strict Protestant household in Milwaukee in 1904, entered U.S. Foreign Service directly after graduating from Princeton in 1925. Having mastered Russian through studies at the University of Berlin, he served in Moscow, Berlin, and Prague before returning to Moscow in 1944 as a special advisor to the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman. In early February 1946 he received a directive from the State Department to analyze a recent speech by Joseph Stalin that Washington considered confrontational and hostile. Kennan, an advocate of a hard line against the Soviet Union, used the opportunity to compose what is arguably the best-known such dispatch in the history of the U.S. Foreign Service (you can read excerpts from the Long Telegram by clicking here). The Long Telegram was read by State Department officials, cabled to U.S. embassies around the world, and made required reading for hundreds of military officers. In 1947 an edited version of the telegram was published as an article by “X” in the journal Foreign Affairs.

In 1947 Kennan was appointed head of the State Department’s newly created policy planning staff with the responsibility for long-range foreign policy planning. His opposition to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to increased military spending, and to U.S. involvement in the Korean War led to his resignation in 1951. Afterwards, with the exception of brief ambassadorships to the Soviet Union in 1952 and to Yugoslavia between 1961 and 1963, he devoted himself to research, writing, and university teaching on foreign policy and Soviet affairs before his death in 2005 (to think this is someone who literally saw World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and September 11, 2001!).

After reading excerpts from the Long Telegram, I would like you all to consider and discuss the following: What views of capitalism and socialism are articulated, according to Kennan, in official Soviet propaganda? What does Kennan consider the most notable characteristics of the Russian past? How, according to Kennan, has this past shaped the policies and views of the Soviet government since in 1917? In Kennan’s view, what role does communist ideology play in shaping the Soviet government’s policies? According to Kennan, what strengths and weaknesses does the Soviet Union bring to the anticipated conflict with the United States? What, according to Kennan, are the implications of his analysis for U.S. foreign and domestic policies? What must be done to counter the Soviet threat? Your thoughts…

Was the Use of a Nuclear Weapon Really Necessary to End the War?

The dropping of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on August 6th and 9th respectively, without a doubt was the ultimate climax of a destructive, violent, and unapologetically ruthless first half of the 20th century. The atomic bomb truly proved to be the ultimate weapon for total war. As the two dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 showed, a single atom bomb could obliterate an entire city. Realizing that fact, the Japanese government offered unconditional surrender. According to “conventional wisdom,” it was necessary to drop these two bombs to end the war. The orthodox view, presented by U.S. officials after the event and generally shared by the U.S. public (even today in 2009), is that, by cutting short the war and sparing the casualties that would have occurred in the planned invasion of Japan, the atomic bomb actually saved many lives, Japanese as well as U.S. This explanation concludes that, although use of the bomb was regrettable, it was nonetheless necessary.

In reality, however, such a view ignores the realities of Japan’s situation in 1945, and it stands in clear contrast to the official United States Strategic Bombing Survey report, released by the United States government itself on July 1, 1946. In this government report, several assessments and conclusions are made, including on the actual effects of the atomic bombs and Japan’s struggle to end the war. The report candidly reveals that, in reality, Japan was all but defeated and defenseless, and that the Japanese were actually negotiating an end to the war with the help of Soviet mediation as early as May 1945 (3 months before the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The report is a bit long (32 pages), but I would like you to read the portion of the report under the headings “The Effects of the Atomic Bombs” and “Japan’s Struggle to End the War” (you can read both of these sections by clicking here). This report certainly provides the reader with an entirely different viewpoint as to the possible reason for the use of the bomb.

After reading this utterly shocking survey, I would like for you all to reflect on and discuss the following: How does the survey sum up eyewitness accounts of the blast? What were the effects of the blasts within seconds of dropping the bombs? What were the initial symptoms of radiation exposure, and how long did it take for symptoms to emerge generally? What was the effect of the blasts on the infrastructure of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? What assessment did Rear Admiral Takagi of the Navy General Staff make of Japan’s ability to stay in the war by February of 1944, according to the government survey? By April 7, 1945, what was Japan’s new premier Suzuki likely going to do, according to the survey? By May 1945, what was Japan now in the process of doing? With who’s help? What could be implied regarding the U.S. use of the atom bomb based on this evidence? What, in fact, was the emperor himself calling for by June 1945? In what ways is this report at times contradictory to Stimson's writings? According to this U.S. government report, was the use of the atomic bomb necessary? Could victory have been attained without it? Your thoughts…

August 6, 1945

In 1951 Dr. Arata Osada, a professor of education at the University of Hiroshima, sponsored a project in which young Japanese from primary grades through the university level were asked to write down their memories of the August 6 bombing and its aftermath. Moved by their recollections, he arranged to have published a sample of their compositions in 1951. His stated purpose was to reveal the horrors of nuclear war and thereby encourage nuclear disarmament. An English translation appeared in 1980. You can read the statements of Iwao Nakamura and Atsuko Tsujioka by clicking here. You can also read the statement of Yamaoka Michiko, who was a high school student in Hiroshima in 1945 and recalls the sunny August day when the atomic bomb hit her city, by clicking here. Her memories were recorded by two American researchers at the end of the 1980s, and they encourage us to really ponder the larger meaning of World War II. Finally, the BBC has an EXCELLENT page regarding this and so much more, and you can access it by clicking here.

Rarely am I at a loss for words, but I truly am after reading these documents. Still, I’d like you all to discuss a couple of major points here. First, what memoires of the atomic blast are important to those who were interviewed that you read? In your opinion, did Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor justify the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Your thoughts…

“The Face of War is the Face of Death”

President Truman, who as a senator from Missouri and as vice president under Roosevelt did not even know about the Manhattan Project (the project to build a nuclear atomic bomb), learned of the atomic bomb in a meeting with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on April 25, 1945, two weeks after President Roosevelt’s death. His first response was to appoint a small committee, known as the Interim Committee, to advise him on the use of atomic weapons in the war and the immediate postwar era. Its members included Stimson and seven others: George Harrison, an insurance executive who was a special assistant to Stimson; James Byrnes, a presidential advisor and soon secretary of state; Ralph Bard, undersecretary of the Navy; William Clayton, assistant secretary of state; Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington; Karl Compton, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and James Conant, president of Harvard University. They were advised by a Scientific Panel, made up of four persons who had played leading roles in the Manhattan Project: Enrico Fermi of Columbia University; Arthur H. Compton of the University of Chicago; Ernest Lawrence of the University of California at Berkeley; and Robert Oppenheimer, director of the atomic energy research project at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

The chair of the Interim Committee and the author of the document I would like you to read was Stimson. Born in 1867 in New York City and a graduate of Harvard College and Yale Law School, Stimson had a distinguished career as a lawyer and public servant. Having served as secretary of war under President Taft and secretary of state under President Hoover, he was named secretary of war by the Democratic president Roosevelt in 1940, despite being a Republican. In 1947, after his retirement form public service and less than three years before his death in 1950, he published the article “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb” in Harper’s Magazine. It focuses on the work of the Interim Committee and the reasons why Stimson advised President Truman to drop the bombs on Japan without warning. You can read excerpts from this article by clicking here.

After reading excerpts from the article, I would like you to think about and discuss the following: How did the background and specific purposes of the Manhattan Project affect decision making in 1945? For those who supported the immediate use of the bombs, what specific goals did they hope to achieve? How was the choice of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as targets related to these goals? How seriously does it appear that views opposing the use of atomic weapons were considered by the Interim Committee and Stimson? Why did they ultimately reject such views? What were Stimson’s views of the nature of war? How did his views affect his decision to support the immediate use of the atomic bombs? Your thoughts…

Life in a Japanese Internment Camp

As World War II began, there were more than 100,000 people of Japanese descent living in the country, mainly along the West Coast. After the “surprise” attack on Pearl Harbor, rumors spread that Japanese in America would hinder the war effort through “fifth column” (espionage or sabotage) actions. Reacting to old suspicions, ignorant fears, and racial prejudice toward all Asians, the federal government ordered Japanese Americans—regardless of loyalty or American citizenship—to abandon their homes and business and be placed in “Relocation Centers.” Nearly 110,000 people were incarcerated in centers that resembled concentration camps: They were located in remote areas that had armed guards, barbed-wire fencing, communal living arrangements in wooden barracks, and poor food. Among those relocated was Charles Kikuchi, an American-born child (Nisei) of Japanese immigrants (Issei), who kept a diary of his internment at Tanforan, a temporary assembly area in northern California. Kikuchi’s diary (which you can read excerpts from by clicking here) reveals the tensions of life in the camp as well as his own torn loyalties between his family and Japanese ancestry and his American citizenship.

After you have read the document, I would like you to reflect on and discuss the following: Why does Charles Kikuchi believe the internment will be harmful to Japanese Americans? Where were Kikuchi’s loyalties? Why could Kikuchi see humor in some Americans’ reaction to internment, yet be fearful of nativist groups like the Native Sons of the Golden West? What does Kikuchi’s diary reveal about the situation of Japanese Americans during World War II? Were the relocation camps necessary? Your thoughts…

World War II: Japanese Memories

World War I was shocking to Westerners because of the huge number of casualties. The 1914-1918 war also had some important repercussions outside the West (notably in the Middle East, where it continued into the 1920s). But World War II was far more lethal and was much more of a genuinely global conflict (or series of linked conflicts). A major difference between the two wars was the situation in East Asia and the Pacific. There was no significant fighting in this area during World War I, but between 1937 and 1945 a bitter “war without mercy,” as one leading scholar put it, tore apart the Asia-Pacific region, destroying the lives of millions of Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Southeast Asians and leaving their countries in ruins.

Central to the fierce and protracted fighting in East Asia and the western Pacific was the attempt by the Japanese to drive the Western colonial powers from the region and restore “Asia to the Asians.” What did the Japanese think about these goals during the war? The document that I would like you to read provides partial answers to that lingering question. It is drawn from a collection of Japanese oral histories recorded by two American researchers at the end of the 1980s. In it, Nogi Harumichi recalls his experiences as a student in Tokyo in 1940-1941. His memories are particularly interesting for the light they shed on the thinking of many ordinary Japanese prior to the attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. You can ready his words by clicking here.

After reading the document, I would like you to consider and discuss the following: What do Nogi’s memories suggest about Japanese public opinion in 1940-1941? Why was there support in Japan for the invasion of China and Southeast Asia? Does there appear to have been any dissent? To what extent was there a relationship between the reforms of the Meiji era and the Japanese expansion in Korea, China, and Southeast Asia?